Operation Market Garden, “A Bridge Too Far”? Options

[admin]

“A Bridge Too Far” the title of Cornelius Ryan’s famous book can best describes “Operation Market Garden”. Market the airborne phase, which was the largest airborne invasion in history. It was to land with thunderclap surprise and take many bridges in Holland that would lead to the Ruhr, the German Industrial heartland, thus ending the war before Christmas 1944. The 101st landed in the area of Eindhoven and was to take several bridges in that area including the Son Bridge and the highway bridge at Eindhoven. The 82nd landed in the Nijmegan area and were responsible for taking the Grave Bridge and the big highway bridge at Nijmegan. The British 1st Airborne Division, The Red Devils were to land and take the true prize the bridge at Arnhem. With these objectives all taken British XXX Corps (Tanks) the Garden portion was to thunder down the single lane highway and back up the lightly armed paratroopers.

The invasion was the brainchild of Field Marshal Montgomery. The American Airborne took its objectives. Actually the British Paratroopers themselves held for longer then would have been thought humanly possible. The reasons for the failure of this operation are still debated today. So lets talk about it here.

[Roel]

The difficulty with operation Market Garden is that many things went wrong, or could have been done in a better way. This makes it difficult to pinpoint an event in the battle that was the cause of failure. Apart from that, I think that even if the goals set for Market Garden were achieved, it could not have ended the war before Christmas, as was said before the start of the battle.

To name a few issues:
- Why did they choose for one lift a day? Two lifts per day was possible and would have had several benefits: the division would have reached maximum force sooner, which ofcouse would have influenced the battle. Drop and landing zones would have to be defended for a shorter period, so more forces could have been deployed to the actual targets, i.e. the bridges.

- Why did General Browning need so much gliders and aircrafts for his HQ? I think that even if the radios worked, his present would not have changed the initial development of the battle. It would have been better to allocate this transportation to the 82nd for instance.

- Why did were the drop zones of the British Airborne Division so far away from its target? The ground south of the Arnhem bridge was supposed to be unsuitable for drop zone. Strangely enough this grounds were choosen as drop zone for the Polish paratroopers (who eventually jumped at Driel).

- Why were Dutch resistance reports and photographic evidence concerning the presents of German Panzers ignored?
- Why didn't the radios at Arnhem work?
- Why was the Nijmegen bridge not attacked immediately after landing
- Why didn't Urquhart pay attention to the ferry at Driel, or failed to recognize the strategic value of the Westerbouwing at Oosterbeek

And I'm sure there are many more issues.

[ohberry@aol.com]

My question has always been: "What kind of tactical genius establishes a front line that is 20 feet wide and 56 miles deep?".

[admin]

My question has always been: "What kind of tactical genius establishes a front line that is 20 feet wide and 56 miles deep?".

Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery or as my dad would say "A Nit Wit Extraordinaire". I have not met many 504th vets that thought much of him.

I might add that my father and all of the 504th Vets that I have spoken with felt the British Soldier was every bit as tough and good as our boys.

[admin]

Roel,

- Why was the Nijmegen bridge not attacked immediately after landing
As I recall from Gavins "On To Berlin"Gen. Gavin agreed that he did not have the proper man power to secure both objectives on D-Day. The Groesbeek heights as you know and probably could comment better then I are a plateau some three hundred feet above the surrounding area, which dominated the approaches to Nijmegen. Gen. Browning ordered and Gen. Gavin agreed that this high ground had to be taken before the Nijmegen Bridges.

It would have been nice if the 1st Independent Polish Brigade landed on D-Day on Nijmegen Bridge with the another Battalion of American Paratroopers on the other side. If the game is all about taking bridges why give the Germans the chance to fortify or perhaps blow both the highway and railroad bridge?

- Why were Dutch resistance reports and photographic evidence concerning the presents of German Panzers ignored?
The Dutch Underground that I consider the best underground in Europe was right on with info of panzer units in the area. Dutch Intelligence man Henri Knap warned London of Panzer divisions in Arnhem on Sept. 14th Major Brian Urghardt, Browning’s intelligence chief, also spotted German tanks on RAF recon photo's. Boy Browning in my opinion didn't want to spoil Monty's show and many fine troops were KIA.

Jim

[Roel]

As I recall from Gavins "On To Berlin"Gen. Gavin agreed that he did not have the proper man power to secure both objectives on D-Day. The Groesbeek heights as you know and probably could comment better then I are a plateau some three hundred feet above the surrounding area, which dominated the approaches to Nijmegen. Gen. Browning ordered and Gen. Gavin agreed that this high ground had to be taken before the Nijmegen Bridges.

It would have been nice if the 1st Independent Polish Brigade landed on D-Day on Nijmegen Bridge with the another Battalion of American Paratroopers on the other side.  If the game is all about taking bridges why give the Germans the chance to fortify or perhaps blow both the highway and railroad bridge?

Indeed, Browning and Gavin decided that the Groesbeek Heights were to be secured firts because of their strategic value. However, according to Gavin he (Gavin) ordered Linquist (commander 508th PIR) just before take off to send the 3rd Battalion towards Nijmegen immediately after they had landed. Gavin wanted to use the element of suprise also for the Nijmegen bridge. And with the assumption that the threath was coming from the east (i.e. Panzers in the Reichswald forest), a battalion sized force seemed sufficient enough to defeat the few German defenders in Nijmegen that were expected. But as it seemed Linquist misunderstood Gavin's order and thought he was to advance to Nijmegen only after he had secured his part of the Groesbeek Heights. When Gavin heard this later on the day of 17 September, he ordered Linquist to advance at once. Then, ofcourse, the element of suprise was gone and what was even worse: SS soldiers from Arnhem went to check on the situation in Nijmegen after the landings and stayed in Nijmegen. The German opposition was now much stronger. The late American advance resulted in heavy fights in the city centre of Nijmegen and they were unable to take the bridge.

I wonder if Gavin's original plan would have worked out. I agree that although the bridge was their ultimate goal, the Groesbeek heights had to be secured. John Frost, in his book 'A Drop Too Many', blames Gavin's and Browning's choice for the failure of Arnhem. He thinks that an airborne force should land as close as possible to its ultimate target. I think is not correct; you can't look to one objective independent from an other objective. In this case one objective influences the other. The evidence for this came already on the second day, when the drop and landing zones were run over by German forces. They could be cleared just in time for the second lift, that was luckily delayed for one hour. Because of the strategic value of heights they had to be secured; what good is a secured bridge if XXX corps can't reach it. If the Germans would have been able to take over the heights, they surely would have made it much more difficult for XXX corps to advance, if not impossible.

The reason I once heard why the Americans did not jump north of the Nijmegen bridge, is because they could end up trapped between the rivers when they failed. Sounds a bit strange, because when you land behind enemey lines, you are always trapped. Maybe again because of the Groesbeek heights, which was Gavin's major concern directly after landing.

Roel

[admin]

Roel,

I agree that not jumping on the bridge may have been a contributing factor to the failure of "Market Garden". However I don't think, John Frost, in his book 'A Drop Too Many', should not put the blame entirely on that issue(seems like this is another book I'm going to have to get a hold of).

Originally in the plans for Market Garden the 101st was chosen to drop into Arnhem. The British staff changed this because they had already spent many weeks planning an earlier drop in that area (Operation Comet). Browning felt that the British would be more familiar with the area then the 101st Airborne. That is how the British and not the Americans were sent to Arnhem.

This brings up an interesting hindsight to history. The 1st British Airborne Cmdr. Major Gen. Urquhart a tough soldier had never jumped from a plane or been inside of a glider. He had been chosen for his airborne assignment quite unexpectedly. Urquahart was long on combat experience in N. Africa, Sicily and in Italy and was a good leader. However he had no airborne experience. The 82nd and 101st Divisions both were Veterans of the Normandy drop and the British 1st had last seen action on Sicily in 1943. The developed tactic has your drop zones directly on top of, or at least immediately adjacent to your objectives. Urquhart had no airborne combat experience to guide his thinking, and the RAF was complaining about the danger of German flak batteries around Arnhem. Urquhart made the fatal mistake of plotting his DZs and LZs 6 to 8 miles east of the Arnhem Bridge. If the 101st had had Arnhem as its objective it would have been interesting what drop zones they would have picked and if the entire outcome may have been different. (Elements of Gerard M. Devlins excellent book Paratrooper used in this post)

[admin]

(IMG:http://www.Strikehold504th.com/jim/MOH.gif) Taken from "The Devils In Baggy Pants",By Ross Carter
Pvt John R Towle:
"Towle who had joined us in Italy, was a quiet self possessed, dark haired boy whose fate and luck it was to be the only bazooka man in the company with any ammunition.
He climbed up the bank, took a quick peep at the tanks, then slid down and got his bazooka. He said ironically "I see I am going to get the Congressional today." He drawled back up and set to work. He would fire his metal pipe, slide down to reload, then crawl back up to a new point. The Krauts swiveled their 88s and tank machine-guns to cover the different portions of the embankment; wherever he stuck his weapon over, they sniped at him point blank range. Towle was facing five tanks weighing sixty tons each. Three hundred tons of mobile forts were being opposed by one man and one bazooka! Finally the stout-hearted trooper forced the tanks to withdraw to the town. His bravery saved our company(C 1st Bn 504th) and the left bank of the Rhine.

In a few minutes a mortar shell dropped on Towle and killed him. Towle got his Congressional posthumously."
(IMG:http://www.Strikehold504th.com/jim/Towle.JPG)

[admin]

Does anyone think that after the Nijmegen Bridge was taken that it was still possible to push on to Arnhem. This was not known at the time but the Germans only had a thin crust around Lent that day (This was obviously not known then). A push using the 504 as infantry support may have broken through. There is no telling what this would have meant to Frost at the Arnhem Bridge it may have helped him hold on with additional infantry and tanks. The break through would have had no tail. It also may have been isolated for a day or so perhaps(not a big deal for Parachute Infantry).

The next day Frost surrendered and the Germans ferried armor and troops into Betewe to stop the British movements north of Nijmegen.
The point of Market-Garden was speed and audacity. The British Cmdr should have been prepared to capitalize on the taking of the Nijmegen Bridge and tried to save the battle.

[Frank]

It would, according to the various battlereports, certainly have been possible to push on to Arnhem after the Waalbridge had been taken. I have corresponded about this with both Lord Carrington and Captain Moffatt Burriss. Carrington stated that he had no orders to push on, but I think he should have ignored his orders. There was no enemy expect 1 88mm gun at that time (21.00 hrs, 20th Sept 1944)

FRank

[Jiggersfromsphil...]

I feel that Monty was at best the British example of " The Peter Principle". His defensive stand and breakout ( aided by Ultra) were not exactly outstanding initiatives. Instead they were carefully calculated operations with limited risk. He knew that the Germans could not maintain the supply chain and
their defeat in North Africa was guaranteed. However his fame clouded responsible decision making and publicity overrode leadership.

Currahee
Jiggersfromsphilly

[admin]

Jiggers,

It is interesting when you look at the New York Times for the period of Market Garden. Monty had such a strangle hold on the publicity of Operation Market Garden you would swear by reading the Newspapers that the 101st and 82nd was not involved or if so in a very limited way. You would also think it was a victory from reading the New York Times.

Jim

[admin]

It would, according to the various battlereports, certainly have been possible to push on to Arnhem after the Waalbridge had been taken. I have corresponded about this with both Lord Carrington and Captain Moffatt Burriss. Carrington stated that he had no orders to push on, but I think he should have ignored his orders. There was no enemy expect 1 88mm gun at that time (21.00 hrs, 20th Sept 1944)

FRank

What bothers me about it all is this. Why sacrifice the 3rd Bn in the Waal River Assault and then not take advantage of it. Did the British not expect it to succeed. The British should have been prepared to capitalize on the shock of a captured Nijmegen Bridge. The Germans were so afraid of what was going to happen the German in charge of the bridge ordered it blown contrary to his orders.

This quote below is from David Webster’s book "Parachute Infantry".
"Montgomery's great gamble to flank the Siegfried Line with the 1st Allied Airborne Army and turn the armor loose in the plains of West Germany had failed. It was not, we were sure, through any lack of courage or determination of the part of the paratroopers, but through the slow ineptness of their countrymen in tanks. A good American armored unit like the 2nd Armored Division, which had helped us in Normandy without any tender regard for property, ammunition, or orders from the rear, would have broken through to the 1st Airborne Division, If General Patton had been in charge of the effort the whole British 2nd Army would have gone through Arnhem and far beyond".

[Frank]

You have to keep some things in mind.

1. The Guards Armoured Division, the British tankdivision at Nijmegen, did ALWAYS work by the book. So there was actually NO possibility for own initiative.

2. The Guards Armoured Division consisted of:

-Scots Guards (1 Machinegun Company)
-Irish Guards (1 Tank & 1 Infantry Battalion)
-Welsh Guards (1 Tank & 1 Infantry Battalion)
-Grenadier Guards (1 Tank & 1 Infantry Battalion)
-Coldstream Guards (1 Tank & 1 Infantry Battalion)

The Grenadier Guards Tank Battalion did for example not support the Irish Guards or the Coldstream Guards, but only the other Battalion of the Grenadier Guards.

So when Lord Carrington (Grenadier Guards) had crossed the Waalbridge, they had to wait on the infantry Battalion of the Grenadier Guards. That Battalion however was at that time still fighting near the RAILWAY Bridge together with some troops of the 505th PIR.

There were other units available, but these were not commited, as they waited on the Grenadier Guards Infantry Battalion to come up.

The next day at noon the Guards Armoured Division attacked with the Irish Guards, instead of using the Grenadier Guards. The Irish Guards Group, commanded by Lt.Col. Joe Vandeleur, had suffered numerous casualties in the previous days.
When, for example, the Irish Guards openend the advance of the 2nd British Army on September 17th, they only numbered 400 men instead of 800 men. They hadn't receive reinforcements after they had landed in France, because there were no reinforcements available.

3. General Horrocks of 30th Corps and General Browning (1st Airborne Corps) were both not the right men to lead the attack. General Dick O'Connor, CO of British 8th Corps, would have done better as he had proved himself in North Africa as a Tank General. Horrocks was an Infantry General.

Browning had NEVER been in action with the Airborne units he commanded. Major-General Matthew Ridgway or Major-General Richard Gale (both had commanded an airborne division in Normandy would have done better.

Montgomery's plan was NOT a bridge too far in my view, but the British CO's who had to carry out the plan were not competent enough to do so. Horrocks and Browning worked both according to the book. And secondly the tankdivision used to push through to Arnhem, the Guards Armoured Division, should not have been used. The US 7th Armoured Division or the British 11th Armoured Division, both were nearby on the 17th, should have been leading the attack.


Frank.

[admin]

Frank,

I agree! I think the plan could have been executed better by more competent Commanders. If you have a plan that calls for audacity and quick moving why would you choose commanders who wait to dot all the it's and cross the T's. I for one would have not chosen "Market Garden" as a plan. However, once the choice was made it called for speed and throwing the book out the window.

Jim